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Highlights
• The G20 acted as a crisis manager when global financial markets were under
threat in 2008 and 2009, and contributed to a positive outcome.  However since
then, in the more routine work of crisis prevention, its performance has been less
convincing at best, and criticism of its effectiveness has increased.
• Nevertheless, a global governance forum such as the G20 is necessary. Allowing
the G20 to slide slowly into irrelevance would be unfortunate because a global
crisis manager is once again needed, this time to deal with the European sove-
reign-debt crisis 
• The first priority is to promptly finalise the macro-coordination framework still
under construction, and strengthen it by bringing intra-regional imbalances expli-
citly to the fore. These should be treated as global imbalances under G20 res-
ponsibility if they have global implications, as the euro crisis certainly does.
Second, decisions should be taken on how the emerging country bloc represen-
ted in the G20 could contribute to provide financial-market support in conditions
of stress. The 3-4 November Cannes G20 summit is an opportunity to strengthen
the G20’s role.
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poorly overall, since its 2008 reshaping. It is true,
however, that its effectiveness has diminished
and that this has happened particularly when it
has tried to be policy coordinator in the (rela-
tively) good times. As we approach the Cannes
Summit (3-4 November), the only meeting
planned for 2001 of G20 heads of state or gov-
ernment, it seems unlikely that the French presi-
dency, in spite of early ambitions and a
substantive agenda, will bring substantive deliv-
erables to the meeting. Many observers perceive a
slow slide into irrelevance, and the G20 has
ceased to be a frequent and topical subject in
newspapers, web bloggings and even scholarly
publications. This is particularly unfortunate at a
time when a crisis manager is against needed.
Starting from these considerations, the final part
of this Policy Contribution discusses what contri-
bution the G20 could make in terms of ensuring
sustainable growth and financial stability in the
global economy.
1 THE CASE FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The controversy over the value and the limits of
economic policy coordination is one of the many
unsettled controversies in economics. Decades-
old discussions have left behind a number of
useful insights, elegant models and plenty of
ambivalent empirical evidence, but no clear
answers or reliable guiding principles for policy-
makers.
In principle the basic issues seem easy to settle:
in an interdependent world, in which national eco-
nomic performance and policies influence others,
there should be benefits from coordinated policy
actions – in other words, deciding policies not only
on the basis of narrow national interests but also
in relation to how they affect others. Moreover,
since economic interdependence has increased in
recent years, due to the surge of international
financial interlinkages, it follows that coordination
THE RESURGENCE OF TURBULENCE in international
financial markets, with the epicentre not in the US
banking system, as in 2008, but in the European
sovereign sector, potentially brings the G20 closer
to the centre of policy action after a phase of
relative eclipse. Many questions arise. Are the
European risks relevant from a global
perspective? Is the G20 (a large grouping, at top
political level but not universally representative
and with little own technical expertise) the right
forum to prevent threats to financial stability? And
if so on both counts, what concretely can and
should the G20 do?
Since its birth the G20 has had two souls, one as
policy coordinator in times of fair weather and one
as crisis manager. In fact, the G20 was born twice:
first in 1999, as a new forum for finance ministers
in the wake of the Asian crisis, and then again in
autumn 2008, when it was upgraded to the level
of heads of state and government in the frantic
weeks following the Lehman demise. In both
cases, the situation called for a crisis manager, not
a fair-weather sailor. The first incarnation aimed to
limit the contagion stemming from emerging but
unstable economies; the second, to reassure
global financial markets in a moment of grave risk.
In both cases, the immediate danger was eventu-
ally averted and most would agree that the G20
contributed to the positive outcome. But in both
cases, after the risks receded, the G20 started to
engage in the more routine task of crisis preven-
tion, mainly through attempts at economic policy
coordination. Here its performance has been at
best less convincing, and criticism of its effec-
tiveness has increased.
For these reasons it is perhaps useful to revisit
some fundamentals: why a G20 should exist at all,
and how it has acted so far and with what degree
of success. We argue that, contrary to what critics
say, a global governance forum such as the G20
is neither unnecessary, nor has it performed
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should have become more valuable and thus more
pursued in practice.
However, for several reasons, economic analysis
has never succeeded in detecting and measuring
these benefits precisely. First, the counterfactual
is lacking: it is not possible to observe what the
outcome would have been, should coordination in
any given circumstance have (or not) materi-
alised. Second, many analyses date back to the
1980s – prior to the surge of international capital
flows and before the start of the emergence of
today’s emerging powers. In that world, interde-
pendence was limited. Third, standard economic
models do not account well for the strength of
empirically observed spillovers through asset
markets1. It is not surprising, therefore, that older
research concluded that benefits from coordina-
tion were negligible.
More recently, economists have revisited the sub-
ject using more sophisticated modelling tools, but
with no more conclusive results. These models are
in general quite restrictive, often assuming con-
stant balance-of-payments equilibrium and no
financial frictions. They do not provide a rationale
for the degree of interdependence observed empir-
ically. Under these assumptions, these models
can hardly provide a prescription for policy coor-
dination for a world that is dominated instead by
persistent global imbalances, very large cross-
border financial holdings among advanced coun-
tries, and large, highly volatile capital flows
between advanced and emerging countries. All in
all, since research suggested that the gains from
coordination are small either because trade and
financial linkages are low, when in fact since then
they have increased markedly, or because they
assume away important aspect of financial glob-
alisation, it does not seem hazardous to assume,
even in absence of solid proof, that coordination
is probably worth pursuing in today’s economy.
Recently, the financial crisis has provided addi-
tional arguments for this view, bringing to the fore
the existence of substantial international
1. See in this respect the
Spillover Reports published
by the International
Monetary Fund in June
2011.
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‘Countries with large developed financial sectors, particularly if their currency performs an
international role, act as financial intermediaries for the rest of the world. Financial regulation
and supervision in those countries is likely to have a significant impact beyond their borders.’
spillovers in particular in the area of financial reg-
ulation. Countries (or regions) with large devel-
oped financial sectors, particularly if their money
performs an international role (such as the US
dollar, or to a lesser extent the euro), typically also
act as financial intermediaries for the rest of the
world. Their financial structures adapt to this role,
collecting abroad large volumes of short-term
funds (bank deposits or short-term securities
traded in liquid markets), and lending abroad, typ-
ically long term. It is clear that, in this situation,
the financial regulation and supervision in those
countries is likely to have a significant impact
beyond their borders. Since financial regulation
remains predominantly a national responsibility
(within some limits determined by the interna-
tional harmonisation of certain standards), and
located in the country where the bank is incorpo-
rated (so called ‘home-country control’), it is clear
that the supervisory regulatory frameworks pre-
vailing in the major financial centres exert signif-
icant international influence, affecting financial
stability in other countries and even globally.
2 EFFECTIVENESS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
These arguments suggest there are likely benefits
from cooperation in global economic governance,
if the institutions and modalities through which
such cooperation is enacted are effective. This is a
big if, however. The incentives to cooperate are
weak, often at the times when they are most
needed. Representativeness typically conflicts
with efficiency of action, which requires a small
number of participants.
The composition of the G20 strikes a difficult
compromise between representation and
efficiency. Political and geographical
representation are supposedly provided by the
presence at the table of the political leaders from
the largest economies, with a correction in favour
of emerging economies – this is, after all, the
distinguishing trait of the G20 relative to its older
‘brother’, the G7. At the same time, efficiency of
debate and decision making requires that the
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number of seats at the table be limited; the
presence of 20 members (19 countries plus the
European Union, not counting invited members
and international organisations) has proved to be
on the high side of manageability.
Another delicate aspect is the G20’s working
arrangements. This includes the internal organi-
sation and the links established with other bodies
that, at a more or less technical level, are already
active in the areas covered by the G20. The G20
has established working links with a number of
entities that are de facto reporting to it (for exam-
ple, the International Monetary Fund, the Finan-
cial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Bank
Supervision) and is assisted by two orders of sub-
structures (ministers and deputy ministers). If
the lack of own technical expertise does not seem
to be a serious limitation – the technical input
comes effectively from the bodies just mentioned
– a more serious challenge has been ensuring
continuity of action over time. In the absence of a
permanent secretariat, agenda setting relies com-
pletely on the annual rotating presidencies, often
with very different priorities from one year to the
next.
Some improvements in working arrangements
could help. Long-term (multi-year) work lines
should be agreed, with the aim of providing guid-
ance to the rotating chair. Leaders and ministers
should also seek input from independent experts.
More ambitiously, a steering group, similar to that
set up in the Financial Stability Board, with a man-
date extending beyond the annual chair, could be
established. A more ambitious possibility along
the same lines would be to set up a small perma-
nent secretariat at the IMF. Its mandate – ensuring
continuity of the process and stronger liaison
between the rotating chairs – would not require
large staffing, and bureaucracy and red tape
should be avoided.
3 HOW HAS THE G20 PERFORMED?
The limited time elapsed (three years) and the few
meetings that have taken place since 2008 (sum-
marised in Table 1) allow only a partial answer to
the question of the G20’s performance. In this
period, the G20 seems to have gone through a
cycle. At first, the ‘new’ G20 Summit constituted a
significant novelty, spurred by a crisis situation.
The initial agendas, shaped by the crisis, were
pragmatic and action-oriented. The initial period,
including the Washington and London meetings
resulted in swift action on financial reform. The
Pittsburgh summit was still effective in terms of
institution building (establishment of a perma-
nent G20, plus the announcement of a new
‘Framework’ for macro-policy coordination). How-
ever, it marked a transition to a second stage, in
which, in the context of economic recovery,
renewed divergence of priorities between
advanced and emerging countries, and reduced
financial market tension, the focus was predomi-
nantly on macroeconomic coordination, and
progress on financial reform stalled.
This evolving pattern emerges clearly from the
wording of the final statements following the
meetings (documents are available at
www.g20.org). The concluding statement of the
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Table 1: From Washington to Cannes
Summit Date Headline priorities
Washington November 2008 Reform of financial regulation
London April 2009 Global stimulus; reform of financial regulation
Pittsburgh September 2009
Rebalancing of world economy; reform of financial
regulation
Toronto June 2010
Rebalancing of world economy; reform of financial
regulation
Seoul November 2010
Rebalancing of world economy; international financial
institutions
Cannes November 2011
International monetary system; commodity prices;
weakening of global growth, euro crisis
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Washington meeting was short and fully concen-
trated on the actions needed to stabilise the finan-
cial markets, with a detailed action plan and
assignment of specific tasks to the IMF and other
bodies. The Washington communiqué conveyed a
sense of urgency and pragmatism, and signalled
a community of policymakers that wanted to be
on top of events and steer them jointly. This
helped the subsequent stabilisation of financial
markets. The London summit was dominated by
the risks of recession and protectionism.
Observers at the time wondered if the world was
heading towards another Great Depression. There
was serious fear of pervasive restrictions to inter-
national trade, as in the 1930s. The London
summit not only maintained the momentum
launched in Washington and signalled that pro-
tectionist pressures would be resisted, but also
decided on a major (in fact, unprecedented)
increase in the resources of international finan-
cial institutions. Importantly, also, among the
public documents produced at the London meet-
ing was a detailed Progress Report, showing that
in the area of financial reform all actions agreed
in the Washington Action Plan were making
progress.
Five months later (September 2009), the summit
in Pittsburgh marked a watershed. In a number of
ways, Pittsburgh achieved significant results, par-
ticularly considering the low expectations on the
eve of the summit. A first result concerned insti-
tution building. The leaders decided that the G20
summit would become a regular event, replacing
the G8 as the forum to which the FSB and the IMF
would report. This amounted to a significant
change in the international financial architecture.
A ‘framework’ for macroeconomic policies was
announced, in which participating countries
would try to coordinate economic policies to
reduce global balance-of-payment imbalances.
Leaders instructed their Finance Ministers to start
a mutual surveillance process over macroeco-
nomic policies, the ‘Mutual Assessment Process’
(MAP), with the technical support of the IMF. But
Pittsburgh also coincided with a marked slow-
down in the productivity of the G20. In subsequent
meetings progress slowed considerably, as the
pressure of economic and financial emergency
abated.
In 2010, the calendar included two summits under
joint Canadian-Korean chairmanship: Toronto and
Seoul. For a long time, discussions were trapped
in semantics regarding how to express, in the final
statements, sensitive concepts about external
imbalances and the exchange-rate policies of
major countries (notably, China). The issue was
ultimately resolved, after major difficulty, more
than a year later at a ministerial meeting in April
2011 under the French G20 presidency. In turn,
the 2011 French presidency added new elements
to the agenda, including, notably, a new focus on
the reform of the international monetary system,
and discussions on the volatility of commodity
processes and how to deal with them. At the time
of writing, however, it is not clear to what extent
these novelties announced by the presidency will
translate into meaningful decisions at the Cannes
summit of 3-4 November.
4 THE G20 AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE
The G20’s agenda remains focused on the priorities
dictated by the 2008 US-centred banking crisis and
the resulting recession. The two main lines of
action – financial regulation and macroeconomic
coordination to contain global imbalances – remain
important and should be pursued. But the G20
would renege on its responsibility if it did not also
focus on today’s paramount problem, the risk of
financial contagion from the sovereign sectors.
The epicentre of these risks is in Europe. Events
have accelerated recently; until June this year, one
could still hope that the euro-debt crisis would
remain confined to a handful of small countries,
financially distressed but manageable by a united
Europe. After all, Greece, Portugal and Ireland com-
bined represent a mere six percent of euro-area
GDP. The European Financial Stability Facility (the
euro ‘rescue fund’ created in May 2010 in
‘The Pittsburgh summit achieved significant results in terms of institution building, but also
coincided with a marked slowdown in the productivity of the G20. In subsequent meetings
progress slowed considerably, as the pressure of economic and financial emergency abated.’
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response to the Greek crisis) seemed sufficient to
provide a backstop, even in the case that the crisis
should spread to Spain. Even the reticence of
some policymakers – for example, in deciding on
the mix between domestic adjustment, official
support and private sector involvement – did not
seem excessively threatening, given the small
amounts involved.
With two large countries (Italy and Spain) under
fire, the risks have become globally relevant. There
are at least three transmission channels.
First, distressed sovereigns are implementing
harsh and growth-adverse adjustment packages,
with negative demand as well as supply impacts.
Uncertainty and precautionary spending behav-
iour will likely extend to more stable countries. In
Germany, in spite of the recent export-driven
expansion, public opinion is hesitant about
endorsing large external transfers and worried by
institutional changes in Europe that are perceived
as potentially damaging for Germany.
Second, financial institutions are under renewed
stress. The euro-area interbank market is again
experiencing strains, as it did during the 2007 liq-
uidity crisis. Banks have suffered from major
stock market declines. As a consequence, policy-
makers want banks to post more capital, which
may result in credit restrictions.
Third, confidence in Europe has been severely
dented by euro-area developments.
On 8 August this year, when the euro crisis sud-
denly aggravated, the G20 issued a statement
expressing the “commitment to take all necessary
initiatives in a coordinated way to support finan-
cial stability” and its readiness to “take action to
ensure financial stability and liquidity in financial
markets”. What will this mean in practice?
A first priority is to promptly finalise the macro-
coordination framework still under construction,
and strengthen it by bringing intra-regional imbal-
ances explicitly to the fore. They should be treated
as global imbalances under G20 responsibility if
they have global implications – the euro crisis cer-
tainly does. So far there was ambiguity in this
respect; on the one hand, Europe has insisted that
its currency zone be treated as a single entity; on
the other, the G20 surveillance mechanism
remains organised on a country-by-country basis.
For example, the group of ‘systemic’ countries sin-
gled out for in-depth examination in the MAP
includes, reportedly, Germany and France and not
the euro area or the EU. Taken literally, this selec-
tion excludes all countries whose sovereign bonds
have come under severe pressure in recent times. 
A second important issue is if, and how, the emerg-
ing bloc represented in the G20 could contribute
to financial market support in conditions of stress.
This follows from the wording of the August com-
muniqué and would be consistent with the G20’s
self-assigned mandate. Unilateral approaches
have been made very recently, reportedly at least,
by some advanced and emerging countries, with-
out success. Even if successful, however, the uni-
lateral approach risks being divisive and
ultimately may exacerbate tensions, not resolve
them. It is in the interest of all G20 members, par-
ticularly the large debtors and exporters, that
global bond markets remain stable. An agreement
by the large G20 creditors to support sovereign
debt markets, preferably under an IMF facility (as
proposed by the former IMF managing director
Johannes Witteveen), would convey a strong and
possibly decisive signal to market participants.
Support should be accompanied by adequate con-
ditionality, consistent with IMF and EU practices. 
The G20 was created in 1998, and reshaped in
2008, with a crisis management imprint. As global
financial instability risks reappear, it will have no
choice but to revert to crisis mode after some time
of tranquil sailing. The more pre-emptive the
action it takes, the better. Though it looks unlikely
at present, Cannes could offer an opportunity. 
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